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CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OF
VIABLE FETUS
Stidam v. Ashmore
109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959)
Plaintiff commenced an action for wrongful death alleging that she was
administratrix of a stillborn child and that while it was a viable fetus the
defendant's negligence caused its death. Demurrer sustained. The Court
of Appeals for Madison County reversed, holding "that plaintiff's petition
stated a valid cause of action .... I"
Actions for wrongful death are statutory in character. "At common law
no action could be founded upon the death of a human being. The rule...
has been altered ... by statutes, the first of which, known as Lord Camp-
bell's Act, was passed in England in 1846.112 Ohio's wrongful death statutes,
patterned after the English act, were originally enacted in 18513 and last
amended in 1953. 4 They have, however, been subject to considerable judi-
cial interpretation.
The court in the instant case relied heavily upon two Ohio cases6
which, while following the minority rule,7 are part of a trend which has
been applauded by legal critics.8 The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the
minority rule in according a tort action to a child for prenatal injuries in
1 Wiseman, P. J., dissenting at page 435.
2 Prosser, Torts 705 (2d ed. 1955).
3 Hirsch, "What Elements of Damage Survive Under § 11-235, General Code,"
33 Ohio L. Rep. 551 (1931).
4 Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.01 (1953) "When the death of a person is caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have entitled the party injured to main-
tain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued .. .the person who would
have been liable if death had not ensued, . . . shall be liable to an action for damages,
not withstanding the death of the person injured. . .
Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.02 (1953) "An action for wrongful death . .. shall be for
the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and other next of kin of the
descendent. The jury may give such damages as it thinks proportional to the pecuniary
injury resulting from such death to the persons, respectively, for whose benefit the
action was brought. .. ."
r The amount of damages recoverable for death by wrongful act must be limited
to the pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiaries. Kennedy v. Byers, 107 Ohio St.
90, 140 N.E. 630 (1923); Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300
(1899) ; Russell v. Sunbury, 37 Ohio St. 372 (1881); Steel v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St. 191
(1876).
However, there is a presumption that pecuniary loss exists in favor of those
legally entitled to services or support from the decedent. Immel v. Richards, 154 Ohio
St. 52, 42 Ohio Op. 128 (1950); Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946).
6 Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
7 Prosser, Torts 175 (2d ed. 1955); 10 A.L.R.2d 1059, 1060 (1950).
8 Prosser, Torts 175 (2d ed. 1955); 10 A.L.R.2d 1059, 1064 and 1071 (1950).
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Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.9 The Williams doctrine was ex-
tended to cover an infant dying after birth of prenatal injuries by permitting
its administrator to bring an action for wrongful death in Jasinsky v. Potts.10
The Williams court was primarily concerned with determining whether an
infant was entitled to be heard in court under the Ohio Constitution" when
its injury occurred prenatally. The court said that:
In accordance with the general rule as to the rights of unborn
children, it is stated in 21 Ohio Jurisprudence 864, Section 3: "It
is a well settled rule of law relative to succession, and to most other
cases in relation to infants, that a child en ventre sa mere, as to
every purpose for the benefit of the child, is to be considered in
esse, though this rule is not to be applied unless the benefit of the
child will thereby be promoted." 12
The Williams court discussed two cases's which held that a cause of action
exists for prenatal injury. The discussions included quotations disclosing
that those courts applied the "benefit" test quoted above.' 4 It is apparent
that enabling an infant to bring an action for his prenatal injuries is bene-
ficial to him. The wrongful death statutes create a cause of action for death
(after birth due to prenatal injuries) and even though the deceased infant
is not benefitted by an award for his wrongful death, the test is met because
he could have brought a tort action "if death had not ensued."15 Thus both
Williams and Jasinsky followed the liberal trend which accords an infant a
cause of action "subsequent to his birth,"'1 for injury while a viable fetus.' 7
When applying the "benefit" test to the instant case it is difficult to
envision how a stillborn child can be benefitted by being considered a person
since the wrongful death statutes are for the benefit of the next of kin of
the deceased person.' s The court in the instant case admittedly disregarded
9 Supra note 6; 10 Ohio St. L.J. 409 (1949).
110 Supra note 6; 19 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 526 (1950).
11 "Injuries wrongfully inflicted upon an unborn viable child capable of existing
independently of the mother are injuries 'done him in his ... person' within the mean-
ing of Section 16, Article 1 of the Constitution and, subsequent to his birth, he may
maintain an action to recover damages for the injury so inflicted." Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., supra note 6, syllabus 2.
12 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., supra note 6, at 118, 87 N.E.2d at 336.
Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines "en ventre sa mere" as "In its mother's
womb" and "in esse" as "In being. Actually existing."
13 Scott v. McPhetters, 93 P.2d 562 (Cal. 1939) affirming 33 Cal. App. 2d 629,
92 P.2d 678 (1939) which applied the California statutory "benefit" test; Montreal
Tramways v. Le Veille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (Supreme Court of Canada 1933).
14 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., supra note 6, at 125, 126, 87 N.E.2d
at 339.
15 See supra note 4.
16 See supra note 11.
17 "The word, 'viable,' is defined in the New Century Dictionary as, 'Capable of
living; physically fitted to live; of a fetus, having reached such a stage of development
as to permit continued existence, uider normal conditions, outside of the womb."
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., supra note 6 at 117, 87 N.E.2d at 335.
18 See supra note 4.
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dicta in Williams which indicated that the child must survive birth for a
cause of action to arise. 19 Quoting Jasinsky the court also gave short shrift
to the contention that the "benefit" test ought to be applied.2 However, as
previously discussed, the "benefit" test is consistent with the result in
Jasinsky. The court also emphasized a portion of Williams, where it appears
that the supreme court may consider a viable fetus a person. 2 ' In lieu of
the "benefit" test the court used logical arguments favoring a cause of action
for prenatal deaths.2 2 Those arguments are convincing and it seems best to
concede on the policy level that a cause of action ought to exist for negli-
gently caused prenatal deaths.
The question remaining is whether the next of kin of a stillborn child
may properly be compensated for its loss through an action for wrongful
death.23 Considering the speculative nature of pecuniary loss to the bene-
ficiaries 24 for the loss of an infant and the failure of the "benefit" test when
applied to prenatal deaths, the result in the instant case is undesirable absent
a legislative revision.25 Moreover, the requirement that the infant be viable26
when injured is unsupportable scientifically 27 and unwarranted by the bene-
fit test.2s Nevertheless, recoveries for prenatal death ought to be permitted
and revision of the wrongful death statutes to allow recoveries would be
in accord with the liberal trend.
William B. Badger
19 Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
20 Id.
21 " 'Was the plaintiff at the time of her injury a person within the meaning of
Section 16, Article 1 of the Constitution?' (Emphasis added.)" Stidam v. Ashmore,
supra note 19 at 433, 167 N.E.2d at 107 quoting Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., supra note 6, at 127, 128, 87 N.E.2d at 340.
22 "Suppose, for example, viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the same
prenatal injury of which one died before and the other after birth. Shall there be a
cause of action for the death of the one and not for that of the other? Surely logic
requires recognition of causes of action for the deaths of both, or for neither. Inasmuch
as the Supreme Court has already determined that there is a cause of action in the case
of the one, we can see no valid reason for denying it in the other." Stidam v. Ashmore,
supra note 19, at 434, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
23 Prosser, Torts 175 (2d ed. 1955).
24 Supra note 4. But see Prosser, Torts 714 (2d ed. 1955).
25 Cases from seven other jurisdictions with similar statutes have allowed a cause
of action in the situation at bar. See 10 A.L.R.2d 639 and 1 A.L.R.2d Supp. Service
690 (1960). See also Prosser, Torts 719 (2d ed. 1955).
26 The Ohio cases, supra notes 6 and 19, have required that the infant be viable.
27 See "Recovery Allowed For Injury To Non-Viable Fetus," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 365.
28 The "benefit" test applies to all unborn children regardless of viability.
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